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The life-cycle consumption-saving model of  Modigliani, Brumberg, and 
Ando (MBA) has long been recognized as a major strand in the postwar 
developments on consumption and saving behavior.  Recently its use or 
misuse in the public finance literature has given this model even more at- 
tention  than the related  permanent  income  hypothesis  (Kotlikoff  and 
Summers (1981). The essence of the life-cycle model is that individuals 
save primarily to maintain  a smooth (or smoother) consumption than 
earnings  path.  Earnings  received  during  a  person's  lifetime  fluctuate 
greatly because of business cycles, systematic variations in earnings with 
age and work experience, and retirement or reduced labor force participa- 
tion. A major emphasis in this model is that individuals will acquire assets 
while working and dissave while retired  when  earnings will  be low or 
zero.' 
The MBA model was developed in the early and mid-1950s to help ex- 
plain consumption data drawn from earlier periods. In those earlier peri- 
ods, however, retirement, the driving force in this model, was rare and 
relatively short lived. Table 5.1 contains data on life expectancy and labor 
force participation  of  men of various  ages for the period  1950-80.  In 
1950, 70% of the men who were 65 participated in the labor market and 
had a remaining life expectancy of only 13 years. The corresponding par- 
ticipation rate and remaining life expectancy for a 70-year-old was 50% 
and 10 years. In 1980 only 35% and 21% of  the men who were 65 and 70 
years old were in the labor force and the remaining life expectancy was 14 
and 11 years. Since pension plans are made at earlier ages, it is useful to 
note that the remaining life expectancy of a 50-year-old male has risen 
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Table 5.1  Participation Rates and Life Expectancy at Selected Dates for Men 
~ 
Age 60  Age 65  Age 70 
Remaining  Remaining  Remaining 
Year  LFPR*  Life Expectancy?  LFPR  Life Expectancy  LFPR  Life Expectancy 
1950  84.7  15  71.7  13  50.0  10 
1960  85.9  16  56.8  13  31.3  10 
1970  83.9  16  49.9  13  30.2  11 
1980  74.0  17  35.2  14  21.3  I1 
Sources: Participation rates from Burkhauser and Turner (1982), p.  305. Life expectancy 
from various Vital Statistics. 
*Labor force participation rate. 
?Remaining life expectancy. 
from 23 years in 1950 to 25 years in 1980. Life expectancy of women has 
risen even more than that of men during this time interval.2 
Several major factors that contribute to the increase in nonparticipa- 
tion of the elderly are the size of the benefits paid by social security rela- 
tive to wages  from working (Parsons), the  actuarial fairness in social 
security and private pension (Lazear), and mandatory retirement ages set 
in private pension plans whose use has grown over time. 
Whatever the reason for retirement, the increase in the expected length 
of time in retirement should influence both the volume of savings and its 
composition. 
In this paper, I will use The Retirement History Survey (RHS) to deter- 
mine how the non-social  security pensions (hereafter, private pensions) 
vary across sociodemographic groups and how the present discounted val- 
ue  of  pensions taken over expected remaining life span correlate with 
expected retirement years. Public and private pensions should be good 
substitutes for the individual. But as Samuelson has pointed out, the pay- 
as-you-go feature of social security can reduce total savings. Thus I will 
also study the interrelationship of the two pensions to get at a set of issues 
initially examined by Feldstein.  In addition I examine the relationship 
with number  of  children,  who are often thought  of  as an alternative 
source of funds during retirement.  Finally I will examine the relationship 
of  pensions to total financial wealth and income derived thereon. The re- 
sults obtained on some of these hypotheses at times may be affected by my 
desire to study the socioeconomic differences. For example, it is of some 
interest to  learn that those without pensions are more likely to be working 
after age 65. It is not really possible to distinguish, however, if the lack of 
a pension caused these people to continue to work or if they selected an 
occupation which they knew would let them work until they died and thus 
did not require a pension. 
The RHS has been used by Blinder, Gordon, and Wise (BGW) to study 
a number of issues related to pensions. Our data set and analyses differ in 125  Determinants of Pension Benefits 
several important ways from theirs. They used primarily the 1971 survey 
and  restricted  themselves to white males.  BGW also  estimated  dollar 
amounts of pensions for people not yet receiving or reporting amounts 
and social security wealth based on four reported wage figures. 
I use the 1977 survey and include women and nonwhites. By  1977 every 
head of household is at least 66 and almost everyone eligible for a pension 
is receiving it. We  calculate social security wealth from benefits received 
or from the social security earnings records, which have been matched to 
the file.4  I also allow for differential life expectancies for different groups. 
All these differences contribute to substantial differences between aver- 
ages shown in the two studies. 
BGW  started  off  with  a tightly specified life-cycle savings model in 
which an intertemporal utility function was maximized. As their paper in- 
dicates, during their study they sustained doubts about the validity or use- 
fulness of this model. (See also Blinder 1982.) My model is more loosely 
structured in part because we wish to examine demographic and other so- 
cioeconomic differences. It  reaches conclusions more  favorable to the 
life-cycle model. 
5.1  The Model 
One can, of course, treat the question raised above as being descriptive 
in nature and obtain the answers without recourse to economic theory. In 
“Pensions and Mortality” (Taubman 198 I), however, I demonstrate how 
it is possible to have a worker demand for pensions and a firm supply of 
pension funds that can be solved to obtain a reduced-form equation that 
depends on the sociodemographic variables I am studying here that does 
not have to include the price or after-tax rate of return on pensions. Thus 
the following model can be thought of as an approximation to such a sys- 
tem: 
(1)  PB = F(SSB, X,  W), 
PB = dollar amount of pension benefits, SSB = present discounted value 
of the dollar amount of social security benefits calculated over remaining 
expected lifetime, X = a vector of sociodemographic characteristics,  W 
= financial wealth. 
5..2  Data 
In 1969 the Retirement History Survey (RHS) was established. At that 
time a random sample of heads of households 58-63  years old was sur- 
veyed. The same group of  people or their surviving spouses were sched- 
uled to be reinterviewed every second year through  1977, though there 
was attrition because of death and other reasons. Two valuable features of 
the RHS are that the sample has been linked to social security records and 126  Paul Taubman 
there is a breakdown of previous year’s income by source. Unfortunately, 
because the man is automatically designated as the head of the household, 
the only women who are respondents in 1969 are widowed, divorced, sep- 
arated, or never married. 
By  1977, the youngest respondent is 67 years old and most pensions are 
being drawn. Because the pension amounts for the previous year are re- 
ported, I do not make use of the 1975 reinterview. The mean and variance 
of some important variables in that year are given in table 5.2 separately 
for men and women. In 1977 the men are about 68 years old; they have fi- 
nancial net worth exclusive of  pensions of about $28,000; their average 
family income is about $10,000; about 28% were in the labor force; 83% 
received social security benefits; half received or expected to receive a pen- 
sion; the average amount of the pension for all men was $1675 but for 
those with a pension was $3793; and their pension and social security 
wealth was $20,676 and $40,377, respectively. The numbers for women 
heads of  households are similar except that wealth, family income, and 
pensions are about one- to three-quarters the size of men’s. 
The data for 1977 have the advantage that everyone is at least 66 and 
likely to have retired and thus able to provide accurate dollar amounts for 
pensions. However, there has been sample attrition that may not be ran- 
dom and 216 people with pensions did not report the amount in  1977. 
Moreover, in 1977 about 7% of the men and women who expect to receive 
a pension still do not have one. 
5.3  Methodology 
Because most people in the sample do not receive a pension, the use of 
the OLS on the whole sample causes statistical problems. To surmount 
this difficulty, I estimate probit equations on the probability of having a 
pension (or having and expecting to have a pension) and OLS regressions 
on pension amount for those with positive pensions. While this is not the 
only method for handling the issue,6  it is appropriate and lets me look at 
two issues of concern, that is, who has pensions and how big are the pen- 
sions of recipients. The two estimates can be combined to obtain estimates 
of the effect of various variables and differences in pension holdings for 
various groups in the total sample. 
5.4  Results 
Probit equations for the probability of receiving a pension are given in 
tables 5.3A and 5.4A for males and females. Corresponding equations for 
the sum of respondents receiving or expecting to receive a pension are giv- 
en in tables 5.3B and 5.4B. 127  Determinants of Pension Benefits 
Table 5.2  Means of  Selected Variables in 1977 RHS Survey 
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Receives pension 
Receives social security 77 
Social security amount 
Social security wealth 
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Pension amount, recipients 
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0 = white 
1  = participating  in labor force 
1 = professional worker 
1  = clerk 
1  = skilled worker 
1  = manager 
1  = self-employed 
Family earnings-pension  income 
Social security income 
I  = receive social security income 
1  = widowed 
1  = divorced or separated 
Education (in years) in 1969 
Wealth 
Number of children 
Lifetime value of  pension income 
Lifetime value of social security income 
1  = married 
Expected years of retirement from 1977 
(0 = still in labor force) 
Pension income in  1977 
Receiving or expecting to receive a pension 
Receiving a pension 
1  = otherwise 
0 = otherwise 
0 = otherwise 
0 = otherwise 
0 = otherwise 
0 = otherwise 
0 = otherwise 
0 = otherwise 
0 = otherwise 
0 = otherwise 
0 = otherwise 
*Excludes pensions and social security benefits. 
tlncludes social security benefits. 
$Some recipients expect to receive another pension in the future. 
$If information is not reported, missing data are set equal to mean. Table 5.3.A  Dependent Variable: Currently Receiving Pension, Males 
Variable 
Maximum  Maximum  Maximum  Maximum 
Likelihood  Likelihood  Likelihood  Likelihood 















Rec  SSN 
Log likelihood  function  - 
-  .40  -  5.08  -  .57  -  6.94  -  .82  -  8.85  -  .24  -  2.92 
.20  1.93  .20  1.81  .25  2.30  .15  1.41 
.036  .30  .023  .19  .048  .39  .0059  .05 
-  .28  -  4.49  -  .30  -  4.81  -  .09  -  1.36  -  .30  -4.76 
.31  3.83  .33  4.05  .30  3.67  .36  4.25 
.042  8.82 
.ooOo70  -3.43 
3399.94  -  3341.46  -  3360.30 
-  .74 
-  3242.21 
-  17.37 Constant  -  .74 
Widowed  .19 
Div/sep  .22 
Nonwhite  -  .27 










Rec SSN  .41 
Wea 77 
Kids 
Log likelihood function  -  3364.28 
-  8.25  -  .81 
1.83  .14 
.18  .I4 
-  4.29  -  .17 
3.68  .24 
.OOO19 
8.35 
-  3274.00 
-9.57  -  .16 
1.33  .18 
0.11  .18 
2.88  .36 
-  2.65  -  .40 
15.67 
-  .71 
-  .28 
-  .20 
-  .62 
-  1.25 





-  12.13 
-3.63 
-4.53 
-  10.01 
-  8.96 
-  3252.52  - 
-  .88 
.20 
-  .03 





-  .66 
-  .31 
-  .18 
-  .67 
-  1.30 
-  .61 
-  .23 
.00000078 
-  .03 
2968.39 






-  1.02 
10.39 
-  9.89 
-3.77 
-  3.85 
-  9.96 
-  9.27 
-  12.89 
-  3.04 
1.52 
-  3.84 Table 5.3.B  Dependent Variable: Currently Receiving or Expecting to Receive Pension, Males 
Maximum  Maximum  Maximum  Maximum 
Likelihood  Likelihood  Likelihood  Likelihood 
Variable  Estimate  t-Value  Estimate  t-Value  Estimate  t-Value  Estimate  t-Value 
Constant  -.07  -1.03  -  5.45  -  5.97  -  .05  -  .61  -  .31  -4.53 
Widowed  .12  1.13  .16  1.56  .I1  1.10  .067  .63 
Div/sep  .ll  -  .93  -  .10  -  1.83  -.I2  -  .99  -  .14  -  1.18 
Nonwhite  -  .25  -  4.09  -  .04  -  .57  -  .27  -4.33  -  .17  -  2.70 
Married  .33  3.84  .32  3.69  .27  3.14  .27  3.08 
Educ 69  2.05  .05  9.81 


























Log likelihood function 
-.17  -2.10 
.08  .74 
-.16  -1.30 
-  .37  -5.97 
.21  2.62 
-  .10  -  1.21 
.06  .55 
-  .15  1.22 
-  .27  -4.37 
.08  2.47 
-  .17 
.ll 
.12 
-  .25 
.I6 
-.I6  -12.99 
-  .23  -2.88 
-.19  -4.07 
-.61  -10.01 
-  1.21  -  9.62 
-.I2  -17.27 
.ll 
-3199.41  -  -  - 3196.29  -  3347.35 
-  1.97  -  .23 
1.08  .14 
-4.03  .04 
1.99  .26 
-  .99  -  .13 
.069 
.OOO17 
-  .0000013 
-  .72 
-  .28 
-  .15 
-  .69 
-  1.28 
-  .65 
2.25  -  .56 









-  .53 
-  9.43 
-  10.86 
-  3.34 
-3.15 
-  10.37 
-9.72 
-  13.88 
-7.12 
-  4.91 Table 5.4.A  Dependent Variable:  Recipient-Currently  Receiving, Females 
Variable 
Maximum  Maximum  Maximum  Maximum 
Likelihood  Likelihood  Likelihood  Likelihood 
Estimate  t-Value  Estimate  t-Value  Estimate  t-Value  Estimate  t-Value 
Constant  -  .30  -  4.65  -  .36  -4.80  -1.35  -11.02  -  .19  -  2.86 
Widowed  -  .31  -  4.21  -  .30  -  4.05  -  .20  -  2.56  -  .33  -4.39 
Divhep  -  .33  -  3.30  -  .32  -3.18  -  .28  -  2.74  -  .32  -  3.20 
Nonwhite  -  .54  -  5.56  -  .52  -3.63  -  .30  -  2.93  -  .54  -  5.54 
Educ 69  .093  10.30 









Log likelihood function  -  1190.74  -  1099.51  -  1132.37 
-  .66 

















Log likelihood function 
-  .56  -  6.39 
-  .32  -  4.27 
-  .34  -  3.43 
-  .52  -  5.35 
.OOO28 
-  .89  -  10.47 
-  .29  -  3.76 
-  .31  -  3.03 
-  .35  -  3.46 
11.46 
-  .40  -  5.42 
-  .25  -  3.32 
-  .21  -  2.64 
-  .43  -  4.33 
.61  5.62 
.20  2.50 
-  .25  -  2.76 
-  .22  -  1.37 
-  .30  -  .96 
.33  4.46 
.1180.51  -  1121.93  -  1163.29  - 
-  1.23 
-  .03 
-  .07 
-  .06 
.07 




-  .17 
-  .51 
.02 
-  .69 
-  .82 
.0000030 
-  .07 
1002.57 
-8.31 
-  .29 
-  .65 
-  .58 
6.46 




-  1.71 
-  2.87 
.07 
-  6.80 
-  6.20 
2.46 
-  3.93 Table 5.4.B  Dependent Variable: Currently Receiving Pension or Expecting to Receive Pension, Females 
Maximum  Maximum  Maximum  Maximum 
Likelihood  Likelihood  Likelihood  Likelihood 
Variable  Estimate  t-Value  Estimate  t-Value  Estimate  t-Value  Estimate  t-Value 
Constant  -.17  -2.68  -  1.17  -9.94  -  .25  -  3.30  -  .64  -  7.68 
Widowed  -.23  -3.13  -  .12  -  1.60  -  .22  -2.92  -  .21  -2.77 
Div/sep  -.33  -3.39  -.29  -2.90  -  .32  -  3.28  -  .32  -3.13 
Nonwhite  -.52  -5.72  -  .28  -3.00  -  .50  -  5.42  -  .37  -  3.92 
Educ 69  -  .089  10.33 
FEarn 77(000)  .oooo15  1.96 
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The first equation contains only marital status and race variables. As 
shown in the first column in table 5.3A, married and white men are sig- 
nificantly more likely to have pensions than single or nonwhite men. The 
last column in the table contains my most comprehensive equation. The 
coefficients  that have a positive and significant effect on the probability 
of having a pension are social security benefits, years of schooling, and 
being married. The negative and significant impacts flow from receiving 
social security benefits, being a labor force participant in 1977, and being 
self-employed and in any (longest) occupation versus an unskilled or blue- 
collar laborer.’ 
These results, while often subject to several interpretations, bear on a 
number of important issues. First, it is well known that married men have 
higher earnings.s In this equation I have controlled for financial wealth 
and for education, current earnings, social security benefits, and longest 
occupation, all of which are proxies for permanent earnings. Yet  married 
men continue to be more likely to have a pension. This suggests that mar- 
ried men have a lower rate of time preference than single men.9 
Second, the nonwhite coefficient is no longer significant. The inclusion 
of  earnings and education has reduced the significance of  this variable. 
Thus nonwhites are not discriminated against directly in the provision of 
pensions though this can hardly be a comfort if  they are discriminated 
against with respect to wages and other determinants of pensions. 
Third, the labor force participation rate variable has the largest t statis- 
tic. Presumably this coefficient reflects two forces. Some people (e.g., col- 
lege professors) will not draw their pension until they retire at some later age. 
In addition, those people who plan to work without retiring are less likely 
to acquire pensions. However, when the same set of variables is used in a 
probit function for “expect to receive pension in the future and not cur- 
rently have one,” the labor force participation variable is significant at 
about the 1% level and has a negative coefficient. That is, they are less 
likely to expect a future pension. Thus this finding is more consistent with 
the life-cycle model. 
Fourth, a person who receives social security is significantly less likely 
to receive a pension. This is consistent with Feldstein’s substitution hy- 
potheses.’O But the higher his social security wealth, the more likely he is 
to receive a pension. This result can be explained in terms of social se- 
curity benefits’ being a proxy for permanent earnings. 
Family income net of private pension benefits is negatively related to 
the probability of having a pension, but the results are not significant. Of 
course, at this point in the life cycle, current income should be a poor 
proxy for permanent income. 
Table 5.4A contains the corresponding results for the women heads of 
household. While they are qualitatively similar, there are some important 
differences. For example, in equation 1, never-married women are much 137  Determinants of Pension Benefits 
more likely than widows to receive a pension even though some widows 
receive payments from their husband’s pension plans. This is probably 
due to the greater labor force participation of single women, the incom- 
plete use of joint and survivor pensions, and a spouse’s dying before vest- 
ing  occurs.  These coefficients become  statistically insignificant in  the 
more complete equations, which have various proxies for work experi- 
ence. 
In my  most recent equation,  I  obtain results qualitatively similar to 
those for men except that professionals and net worth have positive and 
significant coefficients, the family income variable has a significant nega- 
tive coefficient, and some occupations are not significant. 
In tables 5.5 and 5.6 I present OLS regressions for males and females 
who receive one or more pensions in 1977.” Because some of the signs 
change as I move from less to more inclusive equations, I show some of 
the less inclusive versions. In my discussion I concentrate on the most in- 
clusive equations. For women, the equation explains over 60% of the vari- 
ance in the amount of pensions received. Clerks receive smaller pensions 
than unskilled workers who may be more likely to unionize. Widows and 
divorced and separated women receive noticeably smaller amounts than 
single (never-married) women who were more likely to be in the labor 
force and not dependent on a husband’s choosing joint and survivors’ in- 
surance or on alimony provisions. 
Various  proxies for  family permanent  income and wealth  reveal  a 
mixed picture for women. Pension amounts increase significantly with 
family income and education.  However, both the receipt of and dollar 
amount of social security benefits lead to reduced pensions. This may re- 
flect Feldstein’s substitution argument; however, many private pensions 
contain provisions that reduce pension payments by a portion of social se- 
curity benefits. While this mechanism is also one of substitution, it is not 
the mechanism Feldstein speaks of. Moreover, some of these provisions 
are designed to concentrate pensions among high-income individuals who 
are in the higher marginal tax brackets while letting the plan qualify as a 
deductible expense in the IRS code (see Munnell 1982). 
Men continuing in the labor force have much lower pensions. Profes- 
sional and skilled workers are receiving smaller pensions than the un- 
skilled. Divorced and separated men did not sign away their pensions. 
Family income and respondent’s education have large positive effects. Fi- 
nally, dollar amounts of social security benefits are negatively related to 
amount of pension received. (See above for a discussion of why.)  While 
there are some differences between the male and female equations, there is 
substantial agreement. 
I am often more interested in the present discounted wealth than in the 
dollar amount of pensions. 1 have converted the pension benefits into a 
wealth measure in which the benefits are drawn during the person’s ex- Table 5.5 
SBPR.  NWHITE  LFP  PROF  CLERK  SKILLED  MANAG  SELF  MARR  WIDOW  DIV/SEP 
NO.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
Males with Positive Pensions (&Statistics  below Coefficients) 
1.  -  770.2847 
-2.2101 
2.  -  770.3345 
-  2.2097 
3.  -901.0171 
-  2.6222 
4.  -  609.336 
1.7620 
5.  -  11  19.9470 
-  3.2432 
6.  495.3103 
1.4055 
7.  -  629.3474 
-  1.8439 




1 629.06 1 8 
4.9855 
1143.33  370.617  - 













403.7642  -  11  14.7139  1897.9219  338.8010  540.2017 
1.0620  -  5.2566  5.7106  0.3310  1.1917 
- 187.333  -720.463  986.04  305.55  550.210 
-  .508  -  3.508  -  2.957  .311  1.254 
262.8037  346.2207 
.4482  .4942 
263.0195  146.6331 
.4484  .4964 
233.6219  326.2542 
.4045  .4729 
375.4016  641.898 
.6465  .9328 
310.9895  258.7063 
.5390  .3753 
425.7163  520.6323 
.7504  .7681 
305.3132  360.9309 
s334  S274 
497.202  286.073 
.905  1.194 SBPR.  RECSS  FEMPEN  SS77  EDUC69  WEA77  INTRCEPT  KIDS  R-SQUARE  F-STATS 
NO.  11  12  13  14  15  16  17  18  19 
1 
2. 
3.  -  2334.3254 




.0840  - 
6.7937 
-  0.5200 











47 14.60  16 
10.1 135 
194.191  7 
0.3885 
.0034  1.8524 
.0034  1.4816 
.0338  15.3379 
.0239  10.7432 
.0358  16.2491 
.0680  3 1.9722 
7.  326.1150  .0529  13.5650 
8.  -  888.75  .034  -  .3922  214.729  .0185  2516.776  -35.839  .143  22.5258 
7.5301 
-  2.336  2.601  -4.828  8.305  5.979  4.533  -  .84 Table 5.6  Pensions of  Women with Positive Pensions (t-Statistics below Coefficients) 
SBPR.  NWHITE  LFP  PROF  CLERK  SKILLED  MANAG  SELF  WIDOW  DIV/SEP  RECSS 
NO.  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8  9  10 
1.  -  601.4692  -  2156.0823  -2205.6345 
-  1.3280  -  7.9522  -  5.7758 
2.  -616.5217  743.2588  -  2162.5237  -  2207.0276 
-  1.3635  1.7455  -  7.9898  -  5.7900 
3.  -  889.3832  -2212.5000  -  2054.4351  -  1989.0146 
-2.8231  -  8.4468  -  5.5607  -  6.4617 
4.  -  505.69  -2109.7  -2155.4 
-  1.10  -  7.7268  -  5.6225 
5.  -  982.6653  -  2342.1 174  -  2259.4691 
-  2.1873  -  8.7492  -  6.0462 
6.  55.7803  -  1683.7561  -  1983.0435 
0.1276  -  6.3835  -  5.4607 
7.  -  563.7683  1658.1133  -599.1079  -  1288.5254  -  1008.7683  3011.5210  -  1977.8240  -  1958.0813 
-  1.2871  4.9551  -  2.0798  -  3.5067  -  I .5837  2.2832  -1.5510  -5.3283 
8.  -405.566  283.554  1053.223  -408.633  -459.983  -822.263  3315.526  -  1461.858  -  1400.647  -  1824.149 
-  .9760  .720  3.223  -1.523  -  1.301  -  1.336  2.683  -5.481  -  3.949  -  3.887 ~~ 
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pected lifetime and discounted at a rate of  1%. The expected lifetime, 
whose derivation is given in the appendix, varies by characteristics. Be- 
cause I have changed the dependent variable in the OLS equation nonpro- 
portionality and because I have also converted social security benefits to a 
lifetime wealth measure, I have reestimated my most inclusive equations, 
which are shown in table 5.7. The coefficients are similar to those already 
discussed. 
The total effect of any exogenous variable on dollar amount of pension 
received depends on the probability of receiving the pension and the im- 
pact on the pension conditional on receiving one. I have calculated these 
numbers evaluated at the means of the other variables. The results are given 
for my most inclusive constructs in tables 5.8-5.10. 
The first entry in table 5.8 indicates that a married professional male 
has a pension with an expected present discounted value that is $6555 less 
if he receives social security benefits. (The footnote means that a pension 
in a specific occupation was used and not the actual distribution across oc- 
cupations.) While the impacts of receiving social security are always nega- 
tive, the amounts vary substantially by marital status and occupation. It is 
perhaps surprising that blue-collar workers do better than anyone else, 
but this is consistent with other data. 
The impact of self-employment is always negative. Many of these peo- 
ple can continue to work longer, can often acquire large amounts of finan- 
cial asset by  selling their business, and generally acquire more financial 
Table 5.7  Pension Wealth Equations for Males 
Probability of 
Receiving Pension  If Positive 
Variable  MLE  t  Coefficient  t 
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Log likelihood  -  2907.48  R’  = .1823 Table 5.8  Total Marginal Effects of Various Variables on Dollar Amount of Lifetime Pensions 
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-610.08 
-  400.62 
-  363.04 
-  698.31 
-  509.97 
-  421.62 
5.27  2.13 
.655  4.96 
.656  3.88 
I .73  7.43 
-  3.45  9.91 
-  2.77  8.23 
-  1.76  10.47 
-  6.98  12.97 
-  5.28  10.68 
8.30  1.30 
3.53  3.60 













aversus unskilled workers of the same marital status and other variables at their mean. 144  Paul Taubman 
wealth to cover widely fluctuating incomes. While most of these reasons 
are controlled for in this analysis, the results are obtained by evaluating 
the probit function at the sample mean of these variables. 
The impact of race on expected pension wealth is almost zero. As noted 
earlier, there is little difference in payments once other variables are con- 
trolled for though substantial difference in the raw numbers. 
Those still working, who have less need for a pension in the life-cycle 
view, expect to receive from $5600 to $12,300 smaller pensions. Each ad- 
ditional  two-year  change  in  education  adds  $1200-$2300  in  pension 
wealth. Each child reduces expected wealth by $300-$700. Since variation 
in schooling is likely to be larger than in family size, the Barro explanation 
may not be quantitatively important. Each $100 increase in social security 
wealth has effects ranging from a decrease in pension wealth of $5 to an 
increase of $5. These are modest effects. 
The impact of current family income is positive but only ranges from $1 
to $13 with each $100 change. Financial wealth is positively related to  pen- 
sion wealth with impacts of about the same size. 
The differences between  marital  status are given in table 5.9A, eval- 
uated at the means. The comparisons are with never-married men. Mar- 
ried men do better than widows, who do better than divorced men, who 
do better than the never married. These results occur because of differen- 
tials both in life expectancy and in lifetime earnings. 
The results for women are given in tables 5.10A and 5.10B.  For the 
most part they are similar to those for men. However, the coefficient on 
self-employment has changed signs and is large; the effect of  children is 
doubled, the effect of social security wealth is much increased, ranging be- 
tween $10 and $26 per hundred-dollar change in this wealth; the impact of 
changes in financial wealth is muted; and marital status differences are 
smaller. 
These results are derived from equations in which the labor force par- 
ticipation variable is included. As noted earlier, it is possible that pension 
wealth and retirement  decisions are determined or planned for simulta- 
neously. If so, it would be appropriate to eliminate the participation vari- 
able from the pension equations. 
Doing so we obtain tables 5.9B,  5.9C,  5.10C,  and 5.10D.  The effects 
are somewhat different quantitatively. For example, for males the effects 
Table 5.9.A  Marginal Effects of  Marital Status, Single Is Comparison State 
Males 
Marital Status  Professional  Clerk  Skilled  Manager 
Div/sep  9343.52  14791.5  17338.8  9326.72 
Widowed  11202.7  1689.1  19204.7  11770 
Married  15925  2371 1.1  26795.1  16821.  I Table 5.9.B  Total Marginal Effects of  Various Variables on Dollar Amount of Lifetime Pensions, Labor Force Participation Variable Excluded 
Males 
Lifetime 
Receives  2-Year  SS Ben 
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Table 5.9.C  Marginal Effects of Marital Status, Single Is Comparison State, Labor 
Force Participation Excluded 
Males 
Professional  Clerk  Skill  Manager 
Div/sep  8877.39  14564.5  18089.3  9252.35 
Widowed  10895.6  16878.7  20255.3  11971.7 
Married  14404.8  22478  27091.7  15729.8 
of receiving social security are generally substantially closer to zero and 
the educational effects are larger. For females the self-employment effect 
is reduced, presumably because many of the labor force participants are 
self-employed. 
The amount of pension and savings required to finance retirement de- 
pends on how long the person expects to  be retired. This period can differ 
because of variation in life expectancy and date of retirement. (The vari- 
ations in life expectancy also influence the value of social security wealth.) 
I have calculated average life expectancy and average retirement age in 
the following way. First using the RHS I have calculated probit equations 
for the probability of having died by a given year. The equations, which 
are given in the appendix, include as explanatory variables age, race, sex, 
education, and marital status. Let P,, be the probability that a person with 
theyh  set of characteristics will die in year t. The probability of surviving 
through year t is (1 -  PJ. The probability of surviving through year t + k 
is K (1 -  PjJ (1 -  P,,  I+ ,)  . . . (1 -  P,, t + k).  The average life expectancy 
is found by dividing the ?r  term, evaluated from age 60 to age 110, by k,  or 
51 years. The probit equations tell us how the P3  vary as characteristics 
change. 
The average retirement age was calculated in two ways. The first is an 
expectational view.  I used unpublished  March  1975 CPS tabulations on 
employment, unemployment, and nonparticipation by age, race, sex, and 
education to find average expected number of years of  nonparticipation. 
The age groupings were in 10-year intervals beginning at 45. The average 
age of nonparticipation  was subtracted from the average life expectancy. 
The second method uses age in 1977 and adjusts for being not retired then. 
I then estimate the probability of having a pension and the dollar amount 
of the pension on the average retirement period. 
The equations  include  expected  social security  wealth  and financial 
wealth since all three can be used to finance retirement  though not be- 
quests. Labor force participation  is included because  I  assume that the 
18% who are still working in 1977 will have an expected length of  retire- 
ment of zero. This dummy variable permits me to correct any mistake in 
this assumption. As shown in table 5.1 1, the coefficient on actual retire- 
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and highly significant. The labor force participation dummy is significant 
and has a coefficient of $1 1,560, which is far less than the $15,800 average 
in the sample. Of course, the expected date of death is used in calculating 
the expected pension wealth,  and this can lead to spurious correlation 
with retirement time. However, this correlation would be negative and 
would bias the retirement time coefficient downward. Moreover, dollar 
amounts of pensions are positively related to expected number of retire- 
ment years (equation not shown). 
The above results are encouraging in that they indicate people who need 
more assets to maintain consumption over longer retirement periods have 
the assets, controlling for other types of wealth. However, pension wealth 
is generally accumulated over long periods of time. It is quite possible that 
choice of  lifetime occupations occurs much earlier when one’s post-65 
health is unknown. Thus there is some interest in redoing the equation us- 
ing years of retirement expected as of age 45. Separate estimates of  non- 
participation were made by race, sex, and education (0-8, 9-11,  12, 13- 
15, and 16 and more years of schooling). Estimated year of death was also 
calculated for each group. Unfortunately, when the expected retirement 
years were included in the equation, it had a negative, significant coeffi- 
cient and yielded a higher R2  than in the first equation. 
I then decided to separate out the retirement time from the expected 
death date. The results are shown in column 3. The variable for expected 
date of death is insignificant, while the expected years of  retirement vari- 
able is negative and highly significant. Much of the variation in retirement 
is correlated with education and low wages. (See Parsons 1980). Appar- 
ently 1 am picking up the early retirement of this group whose wages and 
earnings base were low. The lower pensions and pension wealth may not 
represent a large decline in consumption or utility. 
Victor Fuchs has suggested that people might use disability payments as 
an alternative source of funds while not working.  I have used the 1973 
CPS-SSA Exact Match Sample to estimate for those 45-65  a probit func- 
tion for the probability of receiving (in 1976) disability payments from 
social security. (After 65 you switch to regular old age benefits.) The equa- 
tion was then evaluated for various configurations and an average prob- 
ability of being on disability was calculated for each different race, sex, 
education, and marital status possibility. When this variable is included in 
Table 5.10.B  Total Marginal Effects of  Marital Status, Single Is Comparison State 
Females 
Professional  Clerk  Skilled  Manager 
Div/sep  2086.1  1664.46  1017.87  9492.83 
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Table 5.10.D  Marginal Effects of Marital Status, Single Is Comparison State 
Females 
Professional  Clerk  Skilled  Manager 
Div/sep  1673.49  1412.91  83 8.897  683.052 
Widowed  3150.33  2408.9  1594.48  1212.65 
Table 5.11  Expected Lifetime Pension and Retirement Times 
Coefficient  &Value  Coefficient  &Value 
Constant  -  6956.6  (3.9)  19051.6  (1.2) 
Expected date death  157.8  (3) 
Expected number retirement  -  2425.4  (16.5) 
Years before 65 
Expected date death-actual  age  1931.7  (10.2) 
Expected social security wealth  .097  (4.9)  .018  (.9) 
Financial wealth 1977  .086  (7.5)  .058  (5.1) 
-  Labor force participant  1977  11560.7  (5.4)  -  11485  (11.3) 
RZ  .05  .09 
the pension or pension wealth equations, it is highly signficant statistically 
but changes other significant coefficients by only modest amounts. 
5.5  Conclusions 
In this paper I have used the Retirement History Survey to study how 
pensions are distributed among the elderly. Combining probit estimates 
for having a pension and OLS regressions for dollar amount of pensions 
and converting to pension wealth by  discounting such benefits over re- 
maining expected life, 1,find that the groups that have substantially less 
pension  wealth  are those  receiving  social  security,  the  self-employed 
males, labor force participants, and those with many offspring. Those 
groups having substantially more pension wealth include currently or pre- 
viously married men and women, the more educated, blue-collar workers, 
and self-employed females. I also find that those with greater expected re- 
alized retirement years have more pension wealth (controlling for other 
forms of nonhuman wealth) available. This last result is not attributable 
just to spurious correlation. 
In a sense, I find that the predictions of Barro (1976), Feldstein (1974), 
Ando and Modigliani (1953), and Modigliani and Brumberg (1954) are all 
correct. There is behavior consistent with parents choosing smaller pen- 
sions and more current consumption if there are children available to help 
them. Recipients of social security, per se, have much less pension wealth. 
Moreover, pensions rise with social security benefits but the amounts are 151  Determinants of Pension Benefits 
far less than dollar for dollar and total savings fall. The basic essence of 
the life-cycle model seems to be correct. People who are not retiring save 
less, and the amount available for retirement increases as the length of re- 
tirement grows. 
Appendix 
I first estimated the probit specification for 1971, 1973, 1975, and 1977 
data with dead versus alive as dependent variables. 
Using the estimated coefficients from above for each year, I computed 
the probability of dying for different configurations of individual charac- 
teristics. For each configuration I computed the probability of dying for 
each age within the age range of the sample for that year. Thus in 1971 I 
computed for a black married male the probability of dying at age 60,61, 
. . .65.  This was done for 1971, 1973,1975 and 1977 samples. 
Thus, for each characteristic combination there are 24 probabilities of 
dying  (each with  a  corresponding  age).  (For  widowed  black  males  I 
dropped 71 data because results are improbable.) 
With the 24 probabilities derived above, I specified 
Inprob = a + Page + e. 
Using OLS (since TSCS regression [error comp] yielded almost identical 
results) I estimated &,  P. This was done for each characteristic combina- 
tion. Using &, b I then computed expected life by evaluation of 
for each combination of characteristics. If the probability of being alive 
(1 -  e" + PAge) became less than zero, I stopped the iteration at the age -  1. 
The above results were used only to measure differences between mar- 
ried, widowed, divorced, or separated. 
From Vital Statistics (1977) I found the expected remaining years of life 
for white males, white females, black males, and black females in 1977. 
Since I guessed that a large proportion of these people were married, I 
used these numbers as reflecting married white males, etc. I then adjusted 
these numbers for being divorced, widowed, etc., by subtracting the dif- 
ferences found above. 152  Paul Taubman 
Table 5.A.1  Probability of  Dying 
1971  1973  1975  1977 
Variable  MLE  MLE  MLE  MLE 
Race  .38  .I4  .081*  ,034' 
Sex  -  3.06  -  .36  -  .16  -  .044* 
Educ 69  -  .0025*  -  .011  -  .014  -  .016 
Widowed  3.49  .55  .60  .63 
Div/sep  -  .0087*  -  2.45  -  2.22  -  2.58 
Married  -  .40*  -  2.22  -2.07  -2.39 
Age  .034*  .030  .019*  .018* 
Constant  -  3.21  -  2.69  -  2.09  -2.10 
*Not significant at the 5% level. 
To compute lifetime social security I combined the spouse's social secu- 
rity benefits with those of the husband or wife. Based on age, marital sta- 
tus, sex, and race, I added on the expected number of years they have to 
live using the numbers from above. 
I then computed 
expected life -  age 77 
t = 1 for age in 1977. 
The identical procedure was followed for pension variable. 
Notes 
1. While the original model assumed zero expected terminal wealth, the model can be 
modified to incorporate bequests. There is an empirical issue of whether the elderly dissave. 
2. These numbers probably understate the increase since the methodology used by the 
Census Bureau assumes everyone dies by age 85. There are more people living beyond this 
age now than in the past. 
3. See Barro (1976);  however, children's presence may induce a person to accept a job with 
higher current salary and lower pension if capital markets are not perfect. 
4. For some purposes my treatment will cause more simultaneous equations problems. 
5.  The estimates of labor force participation for males are in line with those in table 5.1. 
6. For a discussion of the problem and a comparison of alternative treatments, see Duan 
(1982), pp. 20-24. His appendix A shows that the method is consistent even if errors in the 
two equations are correlated. 
7.  A few farmers are included in the omitted category. 
8.  See Behrman et al. (1980). It is not known if this result occurs because they work harder, 
have more responsibilities, specialize more, or if higher-ability males are more attractive 
mates. 
9. Higher earnings are subject to larger marginal tax rates; however, married and single 
people face different tax rate schedules, and it is not clear who faces the higher tax rate. This 153  Determinants of Pension Benefits 
is important since pensions generally allow a person to transfer income to a year with lower 
expected tax rates. 
10. Feldstein may have revised that hypothesis, for the New York Times reports that he 
does not generally think of his pension holding as part of his wealth. 
11. About 200 people, or less than 10% of  the sample, received a pension in 1977 but did 
not report an amount. I omitted these people from the analysis. 
Comment  Victor R. Fuchs 
This  paper  is  an extension  of  Taubman’s  NBER  Working  Paper  811 
(December 1981), “Pensions and Mortality.” The principal objectives are 
(1) to describe how pensions vary across socioeconomic groups; (2) to pay 
special attention  to relations  between private pensions, social security, 
and total financial wealth; and (3) to explore the relation between pension 
wealth and length of retirement. 
The paper partially succeeds on all three counts, but I have some reser- 
vations concerning the data set, omitted variables, and the interpretation 
of results. 
The Data 
Given the advanced age of the persons in the sample, some attention to 
possible biases introduced by selective attrition would be desirable. Con- 
sider the possibility of  selective survival. For every nonwhite man in this 
sample in 1977 there was at least one other who died after the age of 30. (I 
estimate the survival rate for this cohort at about 460 from 1000 at age 
30.) The estimated survival for white men is much higher-about  600 out 
of  1000 at age 30.  The greater selectivity among the surviving nonwhite 
men means that these results could be giving a biased picture of the rela- 
tion between race and pensions.  Survival is also highly correlated with 
years of schooling, raising the possibility of bias for this variable as well. 
The other attrition problem concerns losses from the sample for rea- 
sons other than death (e.g., change of location, illness, refusal to continue 
participation). My impression is that these losses were substantial between 
1969 and 1977. One wonders who was lost and why. These losses from the 
sample may be a particular  problem in the probability of  death regres- 
sions. In these equations divorced and separated men have as low a prob- 
ability of death as married men. This is contrary to all previous results, 
including earlier studies based on the Retirement History Survey. 
Another question about the data concerns the size of  pension wealth 
relative to social security wealth. For 1971, Blinder, Wise, and Gordon 
(1981) estimated social security wealth as 60% of the total of social secur- 
Victor R. Fuchs is professor of economics at Stanford University and program director 
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ity, pension, and financial wealth, and estimated pensions at 11%. In this 
paper the proportions are 45% and 23% respectively. 
Also, why do so many more women than men “expect” to  receive a pen- 
sion, though they are not receiving it in 1977? For every hundred women 
receiving a pension in 1977,69  others expect to receive one. For every hun- 
dred men receiving a pension in 1977, only 16 others expect to receive one. 
Missing Variables 
Although a great many variables are included in the analyses, at least 
two potentially important ones are missing. It is well known that union- 
ized workers have greater pension benefits than nonunionized ones and 
that union status is correlated with several of  the variables that are in- 
cluded. Which relations  dominate? Also, disability payments have not 
been considered. Such payments could play an  important role as a supple- 
ment to pension wealth for men who retire at an early age. Explicit atten- 
tion to disability payments might help clarify the relation between pension 
wealth and years of retirement. The analysis of the relation between pen- 
sions and social security wealth would probably benefit from explicit at- 
tention to the distinction between government and private wage and salary 
workers. 
Interpretation of Results 
Are the right-hand-side variables really exogenous, as stated explicitly 
once and implicitly throughout? There are good reasons to believe that 
many of the important ones are not. The exogeneity of labor force partici- 
pation is highly questionable: many papers based on the RHS data use 
pensions to  explain labor force participation. Self-employment is also sus- 
pect as an exogenous variable. I used the RHS data in a longitudinal mode 
to study switching from wage-and-salary status to self-employment and 
found that the absence of a private pension was the strongest and most 
significant predictor of switching (Fuchs, 1982). 
Problems of endogeneity aside, there is still a serious problem of how to 
interpret  a correlation between pension benefits and various  socioeco- 
nomic characteristics. Suppose one had a variable that was certified by the 
AEA Executive Committee as truly exogenous (e.g.,  height). Suppose 
that, ceteris paribus,  this variable  was  highly correlated  with  pension 
benefits. Does this mean that tall men take a larger share of their compen- 
sation in the form of pensions, or do their higher pensions reflect addi- 
tional compensation? The paper seems ambivalent on this question. At 
one point we read that the fact that married men are more likely to have a 
pension suggests that they have a lower rate of time preference than single 
men. This sounds like they are taking a larger share of their compensation 
in pensions. Later on, the married men are described as “doing better” 
than others, as evidenced by the larger pensions. This sounds like they are 155  Determinants of Pension Benefits 
getting greater compensation. I believe that Taubman leans toward the 
first interpretation, but a more explicit discussion of this question would 
be welcome. 
Why would some men choose to take a larger share of their compensa- 
tion in pension form? The pension literature suggests two principal rea- 
sons: to avoid taxes, and as part of an optimal labor contract that benefits 
both employer and employee by  reducing turnover during the worker’s 
most productive years and then inducing retirement when productivity 
falls. I would underscore a third reason. Some workers (and their wives) 
probably like the forced saving or precommitment  aspect of  pensions. 
They want to save for their old age but doubt their ability to do it on their 
own. Moreover, the rate of return on a group pension may be more favor- 
able than could be obtained through individual purchase of an annuity. A 
fourth possibility is paternalism, or concern about reputation. This might 
help explain why large firms and unions are particularly eager to include 
pensions in the compensation package. 
How do these reasons relate to the regressions reported in this paper? 
The connection is not clear. To make further progress, it will be necessary 
to develop models that permit some discrimination among alternative ex- 
planations. One possibility is to introduce variables that are closely tied to 
a particular explanation. For instance, it should be possible to identify 
men who face different tax schedules (perhaps because of marital status) 
to test whether tax considerations play an important role. State of resi- 
dence affects taxes because some states do not have any income taxes and 
rates vary among the other states. If tax avoidance is an important expla- 
nation  for pensions,  state of  residence should matter. Furthermore, it 
should matter more for high-income workers, that is, there should be an 
interaction effect. 
My final comments concern the relation  between social security and 
pension wealth. For men, the larger the social security benefit, the more 
likely they are to be receiving a pension. But conditional on receiving a 
pension, the larger the social security benefit, the smaller the size of the 
private pension. This is an unusual result. Most variables have the same 
sign in the probability of receiving a pension and the size of pension re- 
gressions, for example, education, labor force participation, occupation. 
What’s happening?  One possibility is  that  government  workers  are a 
much larger proportion of those with private pension than they are of the 
total population. The pensions of government workers are larger, on aver- 
age, than those of private sector workers, but their social security benefits 
are probably much smaller. It is possible that social security benefits and 
pension benefits are positively correlated  for both government workers 
and private sector workers, but that the inclusion of both classes in the 
same regression produces a negative relation. (See fig. 5.C.  1 .) It might be 
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Fig. 5.C.1  Hypothetical relationship between private pensions and social 
security benefits. 
sector employees. Similarly, it probably would be helpful to drop the self- 
employed, since it is highly unlikely that the other variables work the same 
way for self-employed as for wage-and-salary workers. The same might 
be done for farmers. 
In general, one way to tease more out of the data might be through dis- 
aggregation. It may be possible to discriminate among competing expla- 
nations by  looking at differences in the way certain variables work for 
some groups compared to others. 157  Determinants of Pension Benefits 
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